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Compelled speech has, in recent years, emerged as one of the most active areas
of First Amendment jurisprudence. In just the October 2017 Term the Supreme Court
decided two important compelled-speech cases,2 and a third case in which compelled
speech was at the center of the dispute, albeit the Court ducked the issue.3 The lower
courts have also decided a number of important and highly controversial compelled-
speech cases in the past decade.4 And the recent academic commentary on the subject
is, to put it mildly, voluminous.5 Also noteworthy is the sheer range of plaintiffs in
recent cases, from traditional plaintiffs such as the religious nonprofits and dissenting
individuals in the Supreme Court’s recent decisions, to tobacco companies and soft
drink makers.6 Finally, it was also in a compelled-speech case that Justice Kagan,
normally one of the more moderate and understated of the Justices, accused the
conservative majority of “weaponizing the First Amendment . . . to intervene in
1 “The play’s the thing [w]herein I’ll catch the conscience of the king.” WILLIAM
SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET act 2, sc. 2 (Yale Univ. Press ed. 2003).
* Martin Luther King, Jr. Professor of Law and Boochever and Bird Endowed Chair for
the Study and Teaching of Freedom and Equality, University of California, Davis School of Law.
BA, 1986 Yale University. JD, 1990 The University of Chicago. Contact: aabhagwat@uc
davis.edu. Thanks to Professor Tim Zick and to the staff of the William & Mary Bill of Rights
Journal for organizing this great Symposium. Thanks also to my fellow speakers and audience
members for extremely valuable comments. Finally, thanks to participants at the UC Davis
School of Law “Schmooze” for their always-helpful feedback.
2 Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018);
Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018).
3 Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018).
4 See, e.g., Am. Beverage Ass’n v. City & Cty. of S.F., 916 F.3d 749 (9th Cir. 2019) (en
banc); Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. SEC, 748 F.3d 359 (D.C. Cir. 2014), adhered to on reh’g, 800
F.3d 518 (D.C. Cir. 2015); Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. NLRB, 717 F.3d 947 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (en
banc); R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
5 See, e.g., Vikram David Amar & Alan Brownstein, Towards a More Explicit, Independent,
Consistent and Nuanced Compelled Speech Doctrine, ILL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019); William
Baude & Eugene Volokh, Compelled Subsidies and the First Amendment, 132 HARV. L. REV.
171 (2018); Caroline Mala Corbin, Compelled Disclosures, 65 ALA. L. REV. 1277 (2014); Robert
Post, Compelled Commercial Speech, 117 W. VA. L. REV. 867 (2015); Steven H. Shiffrin, What
Is Wrong with Compelled Speech?, 29 J.L. & POL. 499 (2014); Eugene Volokh, The Law of Com-
pelled Speech, 97 TEX. L. REV. 355 (2018).
6 See, e.g., Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates, 138 S. Ct. 2361; Am. Beverage Ass’n,
916 F.3d 749; R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 696 F.3d 1205.
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economic and regulatory policy.”7 Clearly something is afoot in the area of com-
pelled speech.
All of this is frankly quite odd and rather baffling because the law of compelled
speech has been, and continues to be, underdeveloped both doctrinally and theoreti-
cally. In 2006, before the recent explosion of compelled-speech cases, Larry Alexan-
der made the comment that “[t]he harm in compelled speech remains elusive, at least
for me.”8 I agree, and would argue that Alexander’s doubts are even more pertinent
today. In this Article, I want to explore a modest proposal9: What if there is no harm
associated with compelled speech as such, and so no general right against compelled
speech exists at all? What if the Supreme Court has gotten this area of law wrong from
the beginning, which is why the current doctrine is entirely unmoored? And what
if we have been relying on entirely the wrong part of the Constitution to resolve
compelled speech disputes by focusing on free speech principles rather than, as we
should, free exercise of religion? And finally, what implications, if this is correct,
would this have for cases raising issues of compelled speech? My conclusion, in
brief, is that there is no general right against compelled speech, and as a consequence
many, though not all, recent compelled-speech decisions are simply wrong.
Part I looks at recent compelled-speech decisions in the Supreme Court and lower
courts. Part II looks at the origins of the doctrine in classic Supreme Court cases, and
then looks for lessons to be drawn from those decisions. Part III looks at the relation-
ship and differences between the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses of the First
Amendment, focusing in particular on the concept of “freedom of conscience.” Part IV
identifies that “freedom of conscience” as the key principle underlying traditional
compelled-speech doctrine and elucidates the doctrinal implications of that conclusion.
Finally, Part V concludes by briefly summarizing the implications of this analysis for
recent compelled-speech cases, including the special problem of compelled subsidies.
I. COMPELLED SPEECH TODAY
A. The Supreme Court
As just noted, the Supreme Court decided two important compelled-speech cases
at the end of the October 2017 Term.10 The first was National Institute of Family
and Life Advocates v. Becerra (NIFLA).11 At issue in NIFLA was a California statute
that, in relevant part, imposed disclosure requirements on so-called Crisis Pregnancy
Centers—clinics, typically run by pro-life Christian groups, which offer pregnant
7 Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2501 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
8 Larry Alexander, Compelled Speech, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 147, 148 (2006).
9 Cf. JONATHAN SWIFT, A MODEST PROPOSAL FOR PREVENTING THE CHILDREN OF POOR
PEOPLE FROM BEING A BURTHEN TO THEIR PARENTS OR THE COUNTRY, AND FOR MAKING
THEM BENEFICIAL TO THE PUBLICK (London, Weaver Bickerton 1730).
10 See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
11 138 S. Ct. 2361.
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women certain services, including medical services, with the aim of assisting the
(typically poor) women they serve but also discouraging them from obtaining abor-
tions.12 The first disclosure requirement applied to licensed medical facilities who
provide primarily “family planning” and “pregnancy-related services.”13 Such facilities
were required to post, in a prominent location within the facility, a notice stating that
the State of California ran programs providing free or low-cost access to family
planning, prenatal care, and abortion services.14 The second requirement applied to
“unlicensed” clinics that were not licensed medical facilities and did not employ a
licensed medical professional.15 They were required to post a notice on site stating
that the clinic was not a licensed medical facility and had no licensed medical profes-
sional on the premises, and to include a similar disclosure in all advertising materials.16
This statute was challenged by a number of organizations that ran Crisis Pregnancy
Centers, and in a 5–4 decision split along traditional conservative-liberal lines, the Su-
preme Court invalidated both provisions.17 Regarding the licensed facilities provi-
sion, Justice Thomas’s majority opinion begins by describing the notice requirement
as a “content-based regulation of [the clinics’] speech,”18 because “such notices ‘alte[r]
the content of [the clinics’] speech.’”19 As such, the Court suggests the notice require-
ment is presumptively subject to strict scrutiny.20 It is worth taking a pause here to con-
sider how thoroughly odd this analysis is. To begin with, compelled speech always
involves “content-based” regulation because the government, when it compels speech,
compels a specific message, not just an obligation to say whatever the speaker wants.21
Furthermore, the majority is entirely unclear on why placing an obviously government-
written and -mandated notice on one’s wall alters one’s own message.22 After all, the
California law in no way prevented Crisis Pregnancy Centers from speaking out against
abortions.23 Admittedly, the NIFLA Court’s error in this regard is an old error, dating
back to a 1988 decision imposing disclosure requirements on professional fundraisers;24
but for reasons I will develop further in the next part, it was error nonetheless.
In any event, having feinted towards strict scrutiny by invoking content discrim-
ination, the majority then considered the argument accepted by the Ninth Circuit that
12 Id. at 2368.
13 Id. at 2368–69 (quoting CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 123471(a) (West 2016)).
14 Id. at 2369.
15 Id. at 2369–70 (quoting CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 123471(b)).
16 Id. at 2370.
17 See id. at 2370, 2378.
18 Id. at 2371 (quoting Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 795
(1998)).
19 Id. at 2371 (alteration in original) (quoting Riley, 487 U.S. at 795).
20 Id.
21 See Amar & Brownstein, supra note 5, at 11–13.
22 See generally Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates, 138 S. Ct. 2361.
23 See generally id.
24 Riley, 487 U.S. at 795.
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a lower standard of scrutiny should apply because the case involved “professional
speech.”25 The majority expressed deep doubts about such a rule, and distinguished
its earlier decisions seemingly supporting such an approach.26 Regarding the first such
case, Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel,27 the Court limited its reach to laws
requiring “the disclosure of ‘purely factual and uncontroversial information about the
terms under which . . . services will be available,’” and which are not “unjustified or
unduly burdensome.”28 Because the required notice did not relate directly to the ser-
vices provided by licensed clinics but rather to state-provided services, and because
abortion is “anything but an ‘uncontroversial’ topic,” the Court held that Zauderer did
not apply to the licensed-facility notice.29 Regarding another line of cases, epitomized
by Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,30 the Court held that
its reach was limited to rules such as informed-consent requirements which primar-
ily target professional conduct, and only incidentally affect speech.31 Again, the
Court held that because the required notice did not relate to services provided by the
regulated clinics, these cases were not on point.32
The Court ended its analysis with the conclusion that the notice requirement
could not survive even the intermediate scrutiny applied by the Ninth Circuit, much
less strict scrutiny.33 The Court accepted as substantial, California’s stated interest
in educating low-income women about state-provided services, but said the law
nonetheless fails constitutional scrutiny for two reasons.34 First, because the California
law applied only to a small group of clinics, it was “underinclusive.”35 And second, in
any event, California could have achieved its goals in a less burdensome manner by
educating the women itself through some sort of a “public information campaign.”36
Finally, the Court turned to the disclosure requirements for unlicensed facilities.
Here, the Court proceeded quickly. First, it stated that the notice was not justified even
under the lenient standard of Zauderer because California had not demonstrated a
need for such a notice.37 The burden of proof on this point, the Court held, was on
California, which had failed to produce evidence that women did not understand that
25 Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates, 138 S. Ct. at 2371–73 (quoting and reversing
Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Harris, 839 F.3d 823, 839 (9th Cir. 2016)).
26 Id. at 2371–74.
27 471 U.S. 626 (1985).
28 Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates, 138 S. Ct. at 2372 (alteration in original) (quoting
Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651).
29 Id.
30 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
31 Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates, 138 S. Ct. at 2373.
32 Id. at 2372–74.
33 Id. at 2375.
34 Id.
35 Id. at 2375–76 (quoting Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 802 (2011)).
36 Id. at 2376.
37 Id. at 2376–77.
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these clinics were unlicensed.38 Second, the Court held, the notice provision was unduly
burdensome because it required “a 29-word statement from the government, in as many
as 13 different languages” on all advertising.39 This obligation threatened to “drown[]
out the facility’s speech,” and likely make it impossible to advertise in the first place.40
The second major compelled-speech decision from 2018 was Janus v. American
Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, Council 31.41 Janus involved,
not strictly speaking compelled speech, but rather compelled subsidization of the
speech of others.42 The case involved a challenge to “agency fees,” which are fees
that public employees represented by unions must pay to those unions, even if the
employee was not a union member.43 In its 1977 decision in Abood v. Detroit Board
of Education, the Court upheld the constitutionality of such fees against a free-speech
challenge, so long as the fees funded the collective bargaining activities of the union
rather than its political or ideological activities.44 In Janus, the same five-Justice
conservative majority as in NIFLA (with Justice Alito now writing) overruled Abood
and held that any requirement for non-members to subsidize public sector unions
violated the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment.45
The majority’s analysis begins with some broad statements about the underlying
bases for the compelled-speech doctrine.46 It noted that the core purposes of free
speech were to advance “our democratic form of government” and to “further[ ] the
search for truth.”47 It then asserted that “[w]henever the Federal Government or a State
prevents individuals from saying what they think on important matters or compels
them to voice ideas with which they disagree, it undermines these ends.”48 Why that
might be so with respect to compelled speech, the Court did not say, even though all
the academic literature and cases discussing these purposes that it cited involved
speech suppression rather than compulsion.49 The Court then stated the compelled
subsidization of speech raised the same concerns as compelled speech itself, and in
support, it quoted Jefferson’s famous statement from his Bill for Establishing Religious
Freedom that “to compel a man to furnish contributions of money for the propaga-
tion of opinions which he disbelieves and abhor[s] is sinful and tyrannical.”50
38 Id. at 2377.
39 Id. at 2378.
40 Id.
41 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018).
42 See generally id.
43 Id. at 2460–61.
44 Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 225–26, 235–36 (1971), overruled by
Janus, 138 S. Ct. 2448.
45 Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2486.
46 Id. at 2463–64.
47 Id. at 2464 (citations omitted).
48 Id. (emphasis added).
49 See generally id.
50 Id. at 2464 (quoting Thomas Jefferson, A Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom, in 2 THE
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 545 (J. Boyd ed., 1950) (emphasis and footnote omitted)).
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Given these premises, the Court’s conclusion that any forced subsidization of
unions violates the First Amendment followed inevitably because the Court (cor-
rectly) noted that much of what unions do, including when engaging in collective
bargaining, constitutes speech on matters of public concern.51 The only real barrier
the majority appears to have seen to its result was stare decisis, but the majority
made short work of that objection based on the alleged weakness of Abood’s rea-
soning.52 The dissent, unsurprisingly, disagreed with all of this, including most notably
the majority’s assumption that forced subsidies for speech are constitutionally suspect.53
Finally, we come to the Court’s almost-compelled-speech decision from 2018,
Masterpiece Cakeshop Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission.54 In that case, a
baker named Jack Phillips (whose conscience provides the title for this Article) declined
to sell a wedding cake to a same-sex couple because of his religious opposition to
same-sex marriage.55 He was found to have violated a Colorado law prohibiting dis-
crimination on the basis of sexual orientation by places of public accommodation.56
Phillips claimed that this application of the Colorado law violated both his free
speech rights, “by compelling him to exercise his artistic talents to express a message
with which he disagreed,” and his right to free exercise of religion.57 In Colorado’s
administrative system and courts, Phillips’s free-exercise claim was rejected based
on the Supreme Court’s decision in Employment Division, Department of Human
Resources of Oregon v. Smith, which held that the Free Exercise Clause does not
require religiously based exemptions from neutral and generally applicable laws
(which the Colorado anti-discrimination statute surely was).58 His compelled-speech
claim was also rejected on the grounds that baking and selling a cake does not con-
stitute speech.59 The Court granted certiorari on both of these issues, but ultimately
resolved the case on the narrow (and frankly implausible) grounds that in the course
of considering Phillips’s claims, the Colorado administrative authorities had expressed
hostility to religion, thereby violating the Free Exercise Clause.60 The compelled-
speech and core free-exercise claims were thus left for another day.
B. Lower Courts
The federal courts of appeals have decided a number of important and contro-
versial compelled-speech cases in recent years, which, in combination, point to a
51 Id. at 2473–74.
52 Id. at 2478–86.
53 Id. at 2494–95 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (citing Brief for Eugene Volokh et al. as Amici
Curiae at 4–5, Janus, 138 S. Ct. 2448 (No. 16-1466)).
54 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018).
55 Id. at 1724.
56 Id. at 1725–26.
57 Id. at 1726.
58 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990).
59 Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1726.
60 Id. at 1729, 1732.
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startling strengthening and expansion of the compelled-speech doctrine. Because of
space constraints, a full exploration of these cases is impossible, but I will provide
brief summaries of some of the most important decisions.
The most recent of these is the Ninth Circuit’s en banc decision in American
Beverage Association v. City and County of San Francisco.61 At issue was a chal-
lenge to San Francisco’s first-of-its-kind requirement that advertisements and billboards
for “sugar-sweetened beverages” contain health warnings taking up at least 20% of the
advertising space.62 The court applied the Supreme Court’s Zauderer ruling, as
interpreted in NIFLA, concluding (contrary to some other courts of appeals) that its
relatively lenient standard applied to all “health and safety” warnings.63 Ultimately,
however, the court decided that San Francisco’s 20% requirement was “unduly burden-
some” under Zauderer and NIFLA because San Francisco had failed to meet its
burden of proving that the 20% requirement was needed (as opposed to a smaller
percentage such as 10%).64 The 20% rule also, the court concluded, threatened to
“drown[ ] out” or even eliminate the targeted advertising because of the burden it
imposed on such advertising.65
Another important case is the D.C. Circuit’s National Association of Manufacturers
v. Securities & Exchange Commission, decided in 2014 and 2015.66 The National As-
sociation of Manufacturers (NAM) challenged a Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) regulation that, in effect, required companies that used certain minerals in manu-
facturing to disclose, in a publicly available report to be filed with the SEC and on the
company website, whether the company could affirm that the minerals were not funding
conflicts or militias in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.67 The original panel opin-
ion, issued in 2014, held that the lenient Zauderer standard for factual disclosures only
applied to disclosures necessary to prevent or correct deceptive speech, which this dis-
closure clearly did not.68 As such, it concluded, the regulation was subject to the inter-
mediate scrutiny standard applicable to regulations of commercial speech,69 which the
regulation could not survive because the SEC had not met its burden of proving that its
goals could not be achieved using regulatory means less burdensome on speech rights.70
Soon after the panel opinion came out, the D.C. Circuit issued an en banc opinion
rejecting the narrow reading of Zauderer embraced by the panel.71 As a consequence,
61 916 F.3d 749 (9th Cir. 2019) (en banc).
62 Id. at 753–54 (citing S.F., Cal., Health Code art. 42, div. 1, § 4203(a) (2015)).
63 Id. at 755–56.
64 Id. at 757.
65 Id. (quoting Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2378
(2018)).
66 748 F.3d 359 (D.C. Cir. 2014), adhered to on reh’g, 800 F.3d 518 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
67 Id. at 363–65.
68 Id. at 370.
69 Id. at 372 (citing Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S.
557, 565 (1980)).
70 Id. at 373.
71 Am. Meat Inst. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 760 F.3d 18, 20 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (en banc).
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the panel granted rehearing, but then reaffirmed its original result (by the same 2–1
vote) on three separate grounds. First, it held that Zauderer only applied to disclosures
related to point-of-sale advertising, which the SEC requirement did not.72 In addition,
the regulation failed because the SEC had not met its burden to prove that the regulation
would actually benefit victims of civil violence in the Congo.73 Finally, the majority
held that the disclosure required was “controversial” because it forced companies to
condemn themselves, and so fell outside Zauderer.74 Judge Srinivasan’s sharp dissent
contested all of these conclusions, including, notably, the majority’s position that the
word “controversial” from Zauderer referred to political controversy, as opposed to
controverted facts.75
Two more examples, both from the D.C. Circuit, help to round out the picture.
The first is the decision in National Association of Manufacturers v. National Labor
Relations Board, involving a National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) rule requiring
employers to post on their property and websites a notice informing employees of
their rights under the National Labor Relations Act.76 The majority interpreted a
statute prohibiting the NLRB from punishing noncoercive employer speech as also
incorporating the compelled-speech doctrine, despite any statutory text so indicat-
ing.77 It then held that the posting requirement violated this doctrine because the
notice would affect the employer’s own protected speech opposing unionization.78
As with the Supreme Court later in NIFLA, the court failed to explain why this is so,
given that the NLRB rule placed no limits on employers’ speech.79
The final, and most eyebrow-raising case is R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Food
& Drug Administration from 2012.80 This time the challenge was to a Food and
Drug Administration (FDA) regulation, implementing a congressional command that
required cigarette packages to include not only the familiar textual health warning, but
also a “graphic warning” that highlighted the health dangers associated with smoking
in an attention-catching manner.81 The court invalidated the rule.82 It took an extremely
aggressive view of the compelled-speech doctrine, equating laws requiring disclo-
sures with laws suppressing speech, and so presumptively subject to strict scrutiny
because they are content based.83 It then held that the primary exception to this
principle, Zauderer, did not apply for two separate reasons. First, it held that Zauderer
72 See Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. SEC, 800 F.3d 518, 523–24 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (en banc).
73 Id. at 525–26.
74 Id. at 528–30 (quoting Am. Meat Inst., 760 F.3d at 27).
75 Id. at 538 (Srinivasan, J., dissenting) (quoting Am. Meat Inst., 760 F.3d at 27).
76 Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. NLRB, 717 F.3d 947, 949 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
77 Id. at 956.
78 Id. at 959.
79 Id.
80 R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
81 Id. at 1208.
82 Id. at 1221–22.
83 Id. at 1211; see id. at 1212 (discussing the relevant level of scrutiny).
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was limited to disclosures needed to prevent consumer deception84 (a position the
en banc D.C. Circuit, as we have noted, rejected two years later).85 In addition, it held
that the graphic warnings, because of their emotional content, were not “purely factual
and uncontroversial.”86 Finally, the court applied the Central Hudson intermediate-
scrutiny test applicable to commercial-speech regulations (even though that standard
was developed in cases involving speech restrictions), and concluded that under that
standard, the FDA had failed to meet its burden of proving that graphic warnings
actually reduce smoking and so improve health.87
Of course, not every lower court opinion in recent years has struck down dis-
closure requirements.88 But a surprising number have, including in areas such as
health and safety warnings where, until recently, the permissibility of regulation seemed
widely accepted.89 And crucially, in these cases the appellate courts have consistently
placed fairly substantial burdens of proof on the government, on the view that such dis-
closure rules, even in commercial context, impose substantial burdens on free speech
rights.90 We now can turn our attention to the question of where these ideas came from.
II. ORIGINS AND LESSONS
The modern compelled-speech doctrine has its roots in a famous and repeatedly
quoted decision from 1943, and then was further developed in a series of cases from
the 1970s and 1980s. This part summarizes those developments and then considers
some broader themes that emerge from both these early cases as well as the more
recent cases summarized in Part I.
A. Origins
In 1940, in a case titled Minersville School District v. Gobitis, the Supreme Court,
by an 8–1 vote, held that it did not violate the religious rights of two schoolchildren
for a Pennsylvania school district to expel them for failing to participate in a flag sa-
lute.91 The children were members of the Jehovah’s Witnesses religious sect, which
believed that participation in such a ceremony was forbidden by the Bible.92 In re-
sponse, the West Virginia Board of Education and legislature adopted legislation and
84 Id. at 1213.
85 Am. Meat Inst. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 760 F.3d 18, 20 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
86 R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 696 F.3d at 1216–17 (quoting Zauderer v. Office of Disci-
plinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985)).
87 Id. at 1217–22 (citing Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447
U.S. 557, 566 (1980)).
88 See, e.g., Am. Meat Inst., 760 F.3d 18.
89 See id. at 23–25.
90 See id. at 27.
91 Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 597–600 (1940), overruled by W. Va.
State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
92 Id. at 591–92.
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rules requiring all students in public schools to participate in a flag salute cere-
mony.93 A group of Jehovah’s Witnesses then brought suit in federal court seeking
an injunction against enforcement of this requirement.94 A three-judge district court
granted the injunction on the grounds that the mandatory salute violated plaintiffs’
rights of religious freedom,95 and the Supreme Court, by a 6–3 vote, affirmed.96 Nota-
bly, however, Justice Jackson’s majority opinion in Barnette—which remains one
of the most widely admired and cited First Amendment opinions in the history of the
Court—did not rely on the religious freedom argument rejected in Gobitis but ac-
cepted by the lower court in this case.97 To the contrary, the Court explicitly declined
to adopt this reasoning on the grounds that it would deny liberty to individuals who
lacked plaintiffs’ religious beliefs.98 Instead, Justice Jackson relied upon—or to be
more accurate, created out of whole cloth—the concept of compelled speech with the
following sentence: “To sustain the compulsory flag salute we are required to say
that a Bill of Rights which guards the individual’s right to speak his own mind, left
it open to public authorities to compel him to utter what is not in his mind.”99 Justice
Jackson then went on, in the most famous and cited passage from the opinion, to
elucidate the general principle he believed the case established:
If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is
that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be ortho-
dox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion
or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein. If
there are any circumstances which permit an exception, they do
not now occur to us.100
93 Barnette, 319 U.S. at 626.
94 Id. at 629.
95 Barnette v. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ., 47 F. Supp. 251 (S.D.W. Va. 1942), aff’d, 319
U.S. 624 (1943). This result is quite astonishing in light of Gobitis, but the district court con-
cluded that because three of the Justices in the Gobitis majority had expressed a change of
heart, the Court would no longer come out the same way. Id. at 253 (citing Jones v. City of
Opelika, 316 U.S. 584 (1942)). This was, of course, correct.
96 Barnette, 319 U.S. 624. Of the original eight Justices in the Gobitis majority, three Justices
(Black, Douglas, and Murphy) changed their votes, and two had been replaced; the Barnette
majority therefore consisted of the original Gobitis dissenter (Justice, now Chief Justice Stone),
the three turncoats, and the two new appointees (Jackson and Rutledge), and the remaining
three members of the Gobitis majority, including the author Justice Frankfurter, dissented in
Barnette. Compare id., with Minersville Sch. Dist., 310 U.S. 586.
97 Barnette, 319 U.S. at 634–35.
98 Id. (“Nor does the issue as we see it turn on one’s possession of particular religious
views or the sincerity with which they are held. While religion supplies appellee’s motives for
enduring the discomforts of making the issue in this case, many citizens who do not share these
religious views hold such a compulsory rite to infringe constitutional liberty of the individual.”).
99 Id. at 634.
100 Id. at 642.
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Justice Black, joined by Justice Douglas, and Justice Murphy—i.e., the three Jus-
tices who changed their minds about Gobitis—filed concurring opinions.101 What is
notable is that both of these opinions, representing the views of Justices making up half
of the Barnette majority, relied on principles of religious liberty, not freedom of speech
or compelled speech. Justice Black’s opinion explicitly described the right at issue as
one “to the freedom of religion,”102 and went on to express concerns that the compul-
sory flag salute, “when enforced against conscientious objectors, more likely to defeat
than to serve its high purpose, is a handy implement for disguised religious persecu-
tion.”103 Similarly, Justice Murphy’s concurrence focused on “the right of freedom to
believe, freedom to worship one’s Maker according to the dictates of one’s conscience,
a right which the Constitution specifically shelters”104 (though admittedly Murphy
does also reference “the right to speak freely and the right to refrain from speaking
at all,”105albeit confusingly in a sentence that also references religion).106 Justice
Frankfurter’s dissenting opinion is also entirely taken up with considering, and reject-
ing, a claim that religious liberty permits individuals to disobey secular laws which
violate their beliefs.107 When added to the three judges on the district court in Barnette,
it becomes clear that the vast majority of the judges who ruled on the issues in Gobitis
and Barnette thought them to implicate religious liberty, not compelled speech.
After Barnette in 1943, the Court did not consider a compelled-speech issue for
several decades. Then, in 1977, came another case involving a Jehovah’s Witness:
Wooley v. Maynard.108 New Hampshire license plates displayed (and still display)109
the motto “Live Free or Die,” and George Maynard objected to this motto primarily
on religious grounds (he testified that “this slogan is directly at odds with my deeply
held religious convictions”110), though he also cited political disagreement with it.111
He therefore covered up this motto with tape, in violation of state law.112 After being
repeatedly fined, he brought suit to enjoin enforcement of the law.113 The Court, in
101 Id. at 643–44 (Black & Douglas, JJ., concurring); id. at 644–46 (Murphy, J., concurring).
102 Id. at 643 (Black & Douglas, JJ., concurring).
103 Id. at 644.
104 Id. at 645 (Murphy, J., concurring).
105 Id.
106 See id.
107 Id. at 653–54 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). He was, of course, prescient on this point.
See Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990) (noting that free exercise does not relieve
people of having to comply with valid, generally applicable laws).
108 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
109 N.H. DEP’T OF SAFETY DIV. OF MOTOR VEHICLES, Plate Type Examples, https://www
.nh.gov/safety/divisions/dmv/registration/plates.htm [https://perma.cc/GD7K-6U4M] (last
visited Dec. 4, 2019).
110 Maynard, 430 U.S. at 707 n.2.
111 Id.
112 Id. at 708 n.4.
113 Id. at 709.
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an opinion by Chief Justice Burger, ruled in Maynard’s favor.114 Crucially, the majority
cited both the majority opinion and Justice Murphy’s concurrence in Barnette for
the proposition that “the right of freedom of thought protected by the First Amend-
ment . . . includes both the right to speak freely and the right to refrain from speak-
ing at all.”115 Through this often-cited quotation, compelled speech was transformed
from a single case—albeit a famous one—into a doctrine. The Court then held that
Maynard’s claim fell within Barnette because here too “we are faced with a state
measure which forces an individual, as part of his daily life . . . to be an instrument
for fostering public adherence to an ideological point of view he finds unacceptable.”116
Justice Rehnquist dissented on the grounds that Maynard, unlike the schoolchildren
in Barnette, was not actually being required to say anything since no observer would
ascribe the motto to Maynard rather than the State, and he remained free to disavow
the motto through a bumper sticker.117
A point of clarification is required here regarding my argument that Maynard
represents the true birth of the compelled-speech doctrine. Three years before Maynard
the Court decided a case titled Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo,118 and
Maynard and subsequent cases and scholarship often cite Tornillo as a compelled-
speech case.119 This, however, is highly dubious. Tornillo involved a Florida “right
of reply” statute that required any newspaper that “assails” a candidate for political
office based on their “personal character or official record” to print, free of cost, a
reply by the candidate.120 The Court invalidated this statute unanimously, and some
have described this decision as relying on a right against compelled speech on the
part of newspaper editors and owners.121 This, however, is an over-reading of the
case. The trigger for the “right-of-reply” law was criticism of political candidates.
As such, the obligation it imposed to publish a “reply” at the newspaper’s own cost,
and displacing the newspaper’s own preferred coverage, would surely disincentivize
papers from criticizing candidates—a point the majority explicitly noted.122 As such,
the statute in its effect was no different from one imposing a small fine on any paper
that criticized political candidates, a law which in no way implicates “compelled
speech” and yet would surely be held unconstitutional. Certainly the Tornillo opinion
114 Id. at 715–17.
115 Id. at 714 (citing W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 633–34 (1943);
Barnette, 319 U.S. at 645 (Murphy, J., concurring)).
116 Id. at 715.
117 Id. at 721–22 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
118 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
119 Maynard, 430 U.S. at 714 (citing Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241); see, e.g., Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n
of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 796–97 (1988) (citing Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241); Pac.
Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 475 U.S. 1, 9 (1986) (citing Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241);
Alexander, supra note 8, at 149–50; Volokh, supra note 5, at 359–61.
120 Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 242.
121 See, e.g., Shiffrin, supra note 5, at 501–02.
122 Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 257.
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also recognizes a right of “editorial control and judgment” on the part of newspapers;123
but that part of the opinion is cursory and unclear on whether it would be violated
by a truly neutral right-of-access law, for example, requiring newspapers to publish
randomly selected letters to the editor.124 After Barnette, therefore, Maynard was the
first Supreme Court case cleanly raising the problem of pure, compelled speech.
It was not the last. Just one month after deciding Maynard, the Court decided
Abood v. Detroit Board of Education,125 the case overruled by Janus.126 The holding
and fate of Abood have already been discussed,127 and so will not be repeated here,
but one important point should be noted. In Abood, the Court took a relatively
undeveloped doctrine regarding a right against compelled speech, and expanded it
to also cover compelled subsidies for the speech of others with no real support other
than (as we shall see) entirely off-point citations to comments by James Madison
and Thomas Jefferson regarding the compelled subsidization of religious speech.128
Thus did the doctrine gain steam.
After 1977, the Court decided a number of compelled-speech cases, especially
in the 1980s, far more than can be discussed here even briefly. One, however, is
worthy of attention. In Pacific Gas and Electric Co. v. Public Utilities Commission
of California (PG&E), the Court considered an order by the California Public Util-
ities Commission (CPUC), requiring Pacific Gas and Electric Co. (PG&E), a regu-
lated utility, to include within its billing envelope, a newsletter created by a public
interest organization named TURN that opposed utility rate increases.129 The order
was triggered by a complaint filed by TURN before the CPUC challenging PG&E’s
inclusion in the billing envelopes of its own newsletter containing political editori-
als.130 The CPUC order, in effect, displaced PG&E’s newsletter with TURN’s four
times a year.131 A four-Justice plurality opinion by Justice Powell concluded that,
by forcing PG&E to disseminate views it disagreed with, the CPUC had violated the
principle established in Tornillo.132 In particular, the plurality expressed concerns
that the order might discourage PG&E from taking controversial positions because
123 Id. at 258.
124 At least one case, involving cable television, suggests that such a requirement might
be upheld if sufficiently well justified. See generally Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S.
180 (1997) (upholding “must-carry” regulations requiring cable television operators to carry,
free of charge, the signals of local television broadcasting stations).
125 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
126 See Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty. & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448,
2464, 2486 (2018).
127 See supra notes 43–44 and accompanying text.
128 Abood, 431 U.S. at 234 & n.31.
129 Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 475 U.S. 1, 4, 6–7 (1986) (plurality
opinion).
130 Id. at 5–6.
131 Id. at 24 (Marshall, J., concurring in judgment).
132 Id. at 11–13 (opinion of Powell, J.).
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that might encourage TURN to take a contrary stance.133 Justice Marshall wrote an
opinion concurring in the judgment (and providing the necessary fifth vote for the
result) which emphasized the fact that under the CPUC Order, TURN’s newsletter
displaced PG&E’s, which had the effect of suppressing PG&E’s speech, albeit “very
slight[ly].”134 Finally, Justice Rehnquist wrote a sharp dissent, joined by Justices
White and Stevens,135 making two key points. First, he pointed out that Tornillo was
entirely distinguishable because the obligation here, unlike the right of reply, was
not triggered by PG&E’s speech.136 Rehnquist then made a more fundamental ar-
gument, which is worth quoting at length:
This Court has recognized that natural persons enjoy negative
free speech rights because of their interest in self-expression; an
individual’s right not to speak or to associate with the speech of
others is a component of the broader constitutional interest of
natural persons in freedom of conscience. . . . [Justice Rehnquist
then discusses Barnette, Maynard, and Tornillo.]
Extension of the individual freedom of conscience decisions
to business corporations strains the rationale of those cases
beyond the breaking point. To ascribe to such artificial entities
an “intellect” or “mind” for freedom of conscience purposes is
to confuse metaphor with reality.137
The implications of this profoundly thoughtful and almost-exactly correct thought
will be explored in the remainder of this Article.
B. Lessons
At first glance, the important compelled-speech cases in the Supreme Court seem
a motley crew with little in common. A closer look, however, does reveal some pat-
terns. For starters, not all compelled-speech cases are the same. Larry Alexander
(writing before the recent spate of cases) categorized them in four separate lines: (1)
Barnette and Maynard; (2) “compelled support” cases such as Abood; (3) Tornillo and
PG&E, involving compelled speech which disincentivizes speech; and (4) com-
pelled association.138 Eugene Volokh, on the other hand, identified two categories:
“speech compulsions that also restrict speech [such as Tornillo]” and “‘pure speech
133 Id. at 14.
134 Id. at 23–25 (Marshall, J., concurring in judgment).
135 Justice Blackmun did not participate, hence only eight votes were cast. Id. at 2.
136 Id. at 30–31 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
137 Id. at 32–33.
138 Alexander, supra note 8, at 148–50.
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compulsions’ . . . which unduly intrude on the compelled person’s autonomy.”139
Despite small differences in nomenclature, both of their analyses point to an important
conclusion, which is that most compelled-speech cases are not truly about compelled
speech. In particular, “compelled support” (or as I prefer, compelled subsidy) cases
involve money transfers, not compelled speech as such.140 And compelled association
has little or nothing to do with speech, compelled or otherwise.141 That presumably
is why Volokh does not even include these two lines of cases in his categorization.142
But what about the Tornillo line, Alexander’s third category and Volokh’s “speech
compulsions that also restrict speech” category?143 These cases, it becomes obvious
quickly, are not about compelled speech simpliciter, they are rather about punishing
or suppressing speech through the sanction of speech compulsion. As my discussion
of Tornillo made clear, the key harm caused by Florida’s right-of-reply law was to
punish and disincentivize criticism of political candidates.144 Similarly, in PG&E,
Justice Marshall’s key fifth vote relied explicitly on the speech-suppressing effect
of the CPUC order displacing PG&E’s newsletter with TURN’s; and even the plurality
relied heavily on the idea that including TURN’s newsletter would deter PG&E
from taking on controversial topics in its newsletter.145 As such, they are utterly run-
of-the-mill free-speech cases. Finally, Volokh makes the further point that even absent
direct deterrence of this sort, when a speaker is trying to communicate a specific
position, through what Volokh calls a “Coherent Speech Product,” inclusion of
outside material can effectively suppress that message.146 This explains why the right
of “editorial control and judgment” referred to by Tornillo has some force to it, in-
dependent of the deterrent effect of the right of reply.147 Another similar case is
Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, in which a
unanimous Court upheld the constitutional right of organizers of a St. Patrick’s Day
parade to exclude a group of gay, lesbian, and bisexual Irish-Americans who wished
to march under its own banner, because the effect of including it would have been
to alter the message that the parade organizers were seeking to send.148 And in Riley
v. National Federation of the Blind of North Carolina, Inc., the Court struck down
a law requiring professional fundraisers to disclose what percentage of contributions
they collect are actually delivered to charities because the impact of the law would
139 Volokh, supra note 5, at 358.
140 See generally id.
141 See Ashutosh Bhagwat, Associational Speech, 120 YALE L.J. 978, 983–89 (2011) (demon-
strating that historically, association and speech were distinct rights).
142 See generally Volokh, supra note 5.
143 Id. at 358.
144 See Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 257 (1974).
145 See Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 475 U.S. 1, 14, 23–25 (1986) (plu-
rality opinion) (Marshall, J., concurring in judgment).
146 Volokh, supra note 5, at 361–66.
147 Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 258 (Brennan, J., concurring).
148 Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 574–75 (1995).
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be to dilute or silence the message that the fundraisers sought to convey.149 As with
Tornillo, the true harm in these cases is not the speech compulsion as such, but rather
the silencing impact of the speech compulsion, which is of course the concern of
most free speech cases.150
The same cannot, however, be said of Barnette or Maynard, or, for that matter,
Masterpiece Cakeshop. In no way did the obligation to participate in a flag salute
deter or prevent the plaintiffs in Barnette from expressing their views on that subject,
or any other subject.151 Similarly, the words on Maynard’s license plate had no im-
pact on his ability to denounce those words, even on the same car via a bumper sticker
(as the dissent pointed out).152 And if Jack Phillips in Masterpiece Cakeshop had been
obliged to design and bake a cake for a same-sex wedding, this again would have zero
impact on his ability to express his religious views on the validity of such unions.
NIFLA is a bit more complicated, but at least in part shares this characteristic.
In particular, it is hard to see how the notice requirement imposed on licensed Crisis
Pregnancy Centers—informing patients of the available state-provided services
including abortions—in any way disincentivized or impacted the anti-abortion speech
of the Centers’ employees. It should be noted in this regard that, with respect to
licensed Centers, the Court’s comment that posting the state-mandated notices “al-
ter[ed] the content” of the facilities’ speech is frankly inscrutable.153 The notices, as
discussed, had no impact whatsoever on what the Centers’ employees could say on
the subject of abortion or any other subject, including the content of the notice itself.154
Furthermore, no observer would have attributed the message on the notice to the
Centers. True, the notices did “alter” the speech visible at their premises; but that is
a tautology, since of course compelled speech alters speech—if it didn’t, you would-
n’t need to compel it. The notice requirement for unlicensed facilities, however, was
different. The Court struck down the requirement based on its size and burdensomeness
because the result was that “the unlicensed notice drowns out the facility’s own
message,” and in truth “‘effectively rules out’ the possibility of having such a bill-
board in the first place.”155 This conclusion, however, makes this part of NIFLA fall
within the Tornillo line of cases because it is the speech-suppressing effect of the
law that makes it unconstitutional, not the speech compulsion alone.156
What this shows is that most disputes that the Court, and commentators, have
labeled as compelled-speech cases actually involve suppressing or altering the speech
149 Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., 487 U.S. 781, 800–01 (1988).
150 See Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 257.
151 See W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 630, 633 (1943).
152 See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 720, 722 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
153 Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2371 (2018)
(quoting Riley, 487 U.S. at 795).
154 See id. at 2368, 2370.
155 Id. at 2378 (quoting Ibanez v. Fla. Dep’t of Bus. & Prof ’l Regulation, 512 U.S. 136, 146
(1994)).
156 See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
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of the regulated party.157 As such, these plaintiffs would have prevailed even under
conventional free-speech doctrine. In many other cases, where there was no evi-
dence of suppression or misattribution of speech or message, the Court rejected
compelled-speech claims (or variants on them).158 But this cannot explain why
Barnette, Maynard and the licensed facilities in NIFLA won their cases, and why the
Court expressed such sympathy towards the compelled-speech claim in Masterpiece
Cakeshop, describing Jack Phillips’s “dilemma” as “particularly understandable.”159
The commonality among these cases is, of course, obvious. In each of them, the
reason why the claimants did not want to “express” the government’s message (in
Barnette and Masterpiece Cakeshop) or be associated with it (in Maynard and
NIFLA) was that the message violated their sincere religious beliefs.160 In Barnette,
the motivating concern was that participation in the flag salute violated the prohibi-
tion in the Ten Commandments against bowing to graven images, an obligation
which the Witnesses believed was “superior to that of laws enacted by temporal
government.”161 In Maynard, George Maynard described the New Hampshire motto
as being “in conflict with my . . . deeply held religious convictions.”162 In NIFLA,
the majority objected to the fact that California’s required notice (regarding the
availability of state-funded abortions) concerned “the very practice that petitioners
are devoted to opposing” on religious grounds;163 and Justice Kennedy’s concurring
opinion (for four Justices) in that case argued that the notice requirement mandated
individuals associated with the licensed facilities “to contradict their most deeply
held beliefs, beliefs grounded in basic philosophical, ethical, or religious precepts,
or all of these.”164 Finally, in Masterpiece Cakeshop, the Court described the root
of Phillips’s objections as “his deep and sincere religious beliefs.”165
The thesis of this Article is that the religious motivations of individuals who
successfully bring “pure” compelled-speech cases is not only not a coincidence, it
is in fact essential to the strength of their claims. Why this is so, and its implications
for the law of compelled-speech, we will explore soon. But first, a temporary di-
gression is necessary to examine some foundational questions about the rights of
free speech and free exercise of religion.
157 See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
158 See, e.g., Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47 (2006);
Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180 (1997); Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins,
447 U.S. 74 (1980).
159 Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1728 (2018).
160 See Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates, 138 S. Ct. at 2371; Masterpiece Cakeshop,
Ltd., 138 S. Ct. at 1723; Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 713 (1977); W. Va. State Bd. of
Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 629 (1943).
161 Barnette, 319 U.S. at 329.
162 Maynard, 470 U.S. at 707 & n.2.
163 Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates, 138 S. Ct. at 2371.
164 Id. at 2379 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
165 Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd., 138 S. Ct. at 1728.
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III. FREE SPEECH, FREE EXERCISE, AND FREEDOM OF CONSCIENCE
The text of the First Amendment, in full, reads as follows: “Congress shall make
no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof;
or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably
to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.”166
The seeming import of this text is that, aside perhaps from the Establishment
Clause (which seems structural in nature), the Amendment protects a series of personal
rights that are roughly parallel. In particular, the juxtaposition of “free exercise [of
religion]” and “freedom of speech” strongly suggests parallel rights; and indeed, in
many cases, including Barnette, the Court has suggested as much.167 The truth, how-
ever, is quite different, as revealed by the drafting history of the Amendment. I have
examined this history in greater detail elsewhere,168 but will briefly summarize here.
We begin with a punctuational clue. In the text of the First Amendment, the first
two provisions, dealing with religion, are separated from each other by a comma.169
The same is true with the later, in the words of the Court “cognate” rights of speech,
press, assembly, and petition.170 These two groups of rights, however, are separated
by a semicolon, suggesting a less direct relationship.171 And in fact, the drafting
history confirms this. When on June 8, 1789, James Madison proposed the Amend-
ments to Congress that eventually became the Bill of Rights, what became the First
Amendment was listed as three separate provisions: the first protecting religious
freedoms, the second protecting expressive freedoms, and the third protecting assembly
and petition (i.e., political freedoms).172 The latter two provisions, containing the ante-
cedents of the speech, press, assembly, and petition rights, were combined with each
other relatively early in the drafting process, in late July.173 The Religion Clauses,
however, did not become joined to the rest of the Amendment until September 9,
very late in the drafting process and without any explanation.174 Indeed, in George
Mason’s master draft of the Bill of Rights, which provided the template for many
of the amendment proposals sent to Congress by state ratifying conventions, the
166 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
167 Id.; see also W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 645 (1943) (Murphy,
J., concurring).
168 See Ashutosh Bhagwat, Religious Associations: Hosanna-Tabor and the Instrumental
Value of Religious Groups, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. 73, 91–93 (2014).
169 See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
170 Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945); De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364
(1937).
171 See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
172 Amendments Offered in Congress by James Madison June 8, 1789, CONST. SOC’Y ¶¶
6–8, http://www.constitution.org/bor/amd_jmad.htm [https://perma.cc/ZF2C-SQWD] [hereinafter
Amendments Offered by Madison].
173 THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DRAFTS, DEBATES, SOURCES, AND ORIGINS 148
(Neil H. Cogan ed., 2d ed. 2015).
174 Id. at 5–6.
2019] THE CONSCIENCE OF THE BAKER 305
religious liberty provisions are not even listed contiguously to the other rights.175
The apparent parallelism between religion and speech rights in our First Amendment
is, then, a historical accident.
Turning specifically to speech and religion, it turns out that not only do these
provisions have distinct origins, they also serve starkly different purposes. There can
be no serious doubt that the primary (in my view only) function of the Free Speech
Clause, along with its neighbors the Press, Assembly, and Petition Clauses, is the
instrumental one of advancing democratic self-governance.176 No other understand-
ing of the rights in this group other than free speech is even plausible. In particular,
freedom of the press, which both Madison and Mason in their proposed amendments
described as “one of the great bulwarks of liberty,”177 is universally acknowledged
to be important because of its role in advancing democracy and democratic account-
ability. Given the close grouping of freedom of speech with freedom of the press in
every draft and proposal that led to the final First Amendment, it is reasonable to
assume that these two freedoms were understood to share this common goal.178 And
with respect to the assembly and petition rights (as well as the right to instruct rep-
resentatives, which Mason proposed but Madison omitted), there is no plausible
argument that they are personal, dignitary rights as opposed to instrumental rights
designed to effectuate democratic government.
Free exercise of religion, on the other hand, is completely different. Again, starting
with Madison’s and Mason’s draft proposals is revealing. Madison’s original lan-
guage regarding religious rights read as follows: “The civil rights of none shall be
abridged on account of religious belief or worship, nor shall any national religion
be established, nor shall the full and equal rights of conscience be in any manner,
or on any pretext, infringed.”179 Mason’s language is even more revealing:
That Religion or the Duty which we owe to our Creator, and the
manner of discharging it, can be directed only by Reason and
Conviction, not by Force or violence, and therefore all men have
175 George Mason’s Master Draft of the Bill of Rights, CONST. SOC’Y ¶¶ 15–16, 20 (Sept. 17,
1999), http://www.constitution.org/gmason/amd_gmas.htm [https://perma.cc/DD62-VTLW]
[hereinafter Mason’s Master Draft]. Mason circulated those provisions during the ratification
debates as proposed amendments, and were adopted almost verbatim by a number of ratifying
conventions, including those of Virginia, New York, North Carolina and Rhode Island. See
generally id.
176 It is also clear to me that when Justice Holmes famously stated that he was in favor of
the “free trade in ideas” and the advancement of “truth” through the competition of the market,
he was referring to political ideas and political truths. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S.
616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
177 Amendments Offered by Madison, supra note 172, ¶ 7; see also Mason’s Master Draft,
supra note 175, ¶ 16.
178 See, e.g., Amendments Offered by Madison, supra note 172, ¶ 7; Mason’s Master Draft,
supra note 175, ¶ 16.
179 Amendments Offered by Madison, supra note 172, ¶ 6.
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an equal, natural, and unalienable Right to the free Exercise of
Religion according to the Dictates of Conscience, and that no
particular religious Sect or Society of Christians ought to be
favored or established by Law in preference to others.180
Both proposals, in their protection of religious liberty, are focused on one basic idea:
freedom of conscience.181 Indeed, Madison was so thoroughly focused on conscience
that even though his proposals to Congress were heavily influenced by Mason’s
master draft (both directly and through the many proposals of state ratifying conven-
tions that essentially copied Mason) he dropped the phrase “free exercise of reli-
gion” entirely from his proposed amendment, stating the principle as “equal rights
of conscience.”182
Michael McConnell’s careful exploration of the background and drafting history
of the Religion Clauses confirms this conclusion.183 He points out that almost every
proposal or draft of a constitutional amendment to protect religious liberty either
treated “rights of conscience” and “free exercise of religion” as interchangeable
concepts, or treated them as a joint principle protecting exercise of religion “accord-
ing to the dictates of conscience” (the only notable exception was a proposal by
Fisher Ames).184 This is why Madison’s failure to include “free exercise of religion”
in his original proposed amendment is unexceptionable—because he thought that
protecting rights of conscience accomplished the same end.185 That end was to
protect religiously motivated conduct from government interference (McConnell,
writing in response to the Court’s recent decision in Employment Division v. Smith,
emphasizes that the amendment was intended to protect conduct, not merely belief).186
Finally, the drafting history makes clear, and there is broad agreement among
scholars on this point, that the primary reason it is necessary to protect freedom of
religion/conscience is the fundamental immorality of forcing individuals to choose
between the dictates of secular government and their understanding of the dictates
of a divine being.187
180 Mason’s Master Draft, supra note 175, ¶ 20.
181 See Amendments Offered by Madison, supra note 172, ¶ 7; Mason’s Master Draft,
supra note 175, ¶ 20.
182 Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise
of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1481–82 (1990).
183 See generally id.
184 Id. at 1480–83.
185 See id. at 1481.
186 Id. at 1489–90.
187 JOHN H. GARVEY, WHAT ARE FREEDOMS FOR? 52–53 (1996); Alan E. Brownstein, Justi-
fying Free Exercise Rights, 1 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 504, 517–23 (2003); McConnell, supra note
182, at 1497–98; Micah Schwartzman, Conscience, Speech, and Money, 97 VA. L. REV. 317,
336 (2011); Steven D. Smith, What Does Religion Have to Do with Freedom of Conscience?,
76 U. COLO. L. REV. 911, 922–23 (2005).
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One further point is worth highlighting—the possible significance of the fact
that the final version of the First Amendment ended up dropping any reference to
“conscience” as such, and instead limits protection to “free exercise of religion.”188
Michael McConnell has argued that this decision may have been motivated by a
desire to limit protection to religious conscience-based claims, and so to exclude
conscience claims rooted in more secular belief systems.189 He concedes, however,
that another explanation is that given the perceived equivalence of religion and
conscience among the Framers, the choice had no significance.190 Steven D. Smith
has convincingly argued that this is, in fact, the best explanation for this drafting
choice.191 The importance of this issue is explored briefly below, but from a purely
historical/Originalist perspective it matters little because, as Micah Schwartzman
points out, for the Framers a non-theistic world-view that imposes conscientious
obligations similar to those of religion was simply unthinkable.192
Some key conclusions follow from all of this. First, freedom of speech, along
with its cognate First Amendment rights (press, assembly, and petition), was in-
tended primarily and probably exclusively to advance the instrumental goals of
preserving democratic self-governance.193 They were not in any meaningful sense
personal, dignitary rights.194 Second, free exercise of religion is utterly different. Its
drafting history reveals evidence of few, if any, instrumental goals.195 Instead, the
Free Exercise of Religion was universally understood as a dignitary right tied to
individual conscience.196 It was protected because of the dual understanding that the
State had no interest in interfering with individual conscience, and because of the
unfairness of forcing an individual to choose between, as Madison put it, “the duty
of every man to render to the Creator such homage, and such only, as he believes to
be acceptable to him,” and “the claims of Civil Society.”197 Finally, implicit in all
of this is that it would be at least as wrong for the State to compel conduct prohibited
by an individual’s religion, as to forbid conduct required by it—this presumably is
why Madison would have protected “homage, and such only, as” individuals believe
required by their conscience.198
188 See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
189 McConnell, supra note 182, at 1495–99; Michael W. McConnell, The Problem of
Singling Out Religion, 50 DEPAUL L. REV. 1, 12 (2000).
190 McConnell, supra note 182, at 1488.
191 See Smith, supra note 187, at 911–12.
192 See Micah Schwartzman, What if Religion Is Not Special?, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 1351,
1405–06, 1426 (2012).
193 See supra notes 176–77 and accompanying text.
194 See supra notes 177–78 and accompanying text.
195 See supra notes 179–82 and accompanying text.
196 See supra notes 180–82 and accompanying text.
197 James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, reprinted
in THE SUPREME COURT ON CHURCH AND STATE 18–19 (Robert S. Alley ed., 1988).
198 Id. at 18 (emphasis added).
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IV. COMPELLED SPEECH AND CONSCIENCE
Much of the background and conclusions that I outlined in the previous Part are
well-known and uncontroversial. Indeed, the only point that arguably is controver-
sial is the proposition that the Free Speech Clause serves exclusively instrumental,
democracy-oriented goals, rather than dignitary ones as well. That proposition,
however, has been so thoroughly demonstrated elsewhere that I will proceed with
it as a given.199 Once these premises are accepted, however, some striking conclu-
sions regarding the problem of compelled speech follow quite clearly.
A. Why Is Compelled Speech Constitutional?
To reach those conclusions, a preliminary question must be explored which is
why we believe that compelled speech raises constitutional questions. In particular,
is the compelled-speech doctrine best understood as advancing the instrumental,
democracy-based goals of the Free Speech Clause and its neighbors, or the conscience-
and dignity-based goals of the Free Exercise Clause? The answer, as it turns out, is
quite clear.
The truth is that an instrumental, democracy-enhancing explanation for pure
compelled-speech claims simply makes no sense. Certainly in cases such as Tornillo
and PG&E, when a compelled-speech claim masks suppression of speech, instru-
mental explanations are available (indeed, overwhelmingly so in Tornillo, where the
effect of the right-of-reply statute was to punish criticisms of politicians).200 But
when one moves beyond this category to cases such as Barnette and Maynard,
where no plausible suppression can be identified, instrumental arguments are much
harder to formulate.201
One possible democracy-based argument one might make is that compelled
speech distorts public debate (which all agree is essential to democracy), because
observers may misattribute the government’s chosen message to compelled speakers
and so exaggerate the support for that message. But given that everyone knew the
199 See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 121–24
(1993); Ashutosh Bhagwat, When Speech Is Not “Speech,” 78 OHIO ST. L.J. 839, 872–74 (2017);
Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1,
20–21 (1971); Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 S. CT. REV.
245, 255 (1961); Robert Post, Participatory Democracy and Free Speech, 97 VA. L. REV. 477,
482 (2011); James Weinstein, Participatory Democracy as the Central Value of American
Free Speech Doctrine, 97 VA. L. REV. 491, 493–97 (2011). In any event, most of the practical
conclusions that I reach in this part would not change significantly if one located conscience-
based claims in the Free Speech rather than the Free Exercise Clause, since either way,
compelled-speech claims not rooted in individual conscience must be rejected.
200 Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 475 U.S. 1, 14 (1986) (plurality opinion);
Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 257 (1974).
201 Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714–15 (1977); W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 633–34 (1943).
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government was behind the required flag salute in Barnette, the license plate motto
in Maynard, the notice of the availability of publicly funded medical services in
NIFLA, and the obligation to serve gay customers in Masterpiece Cakeshop, this is
most implausible.202 Indeed, given that the challenged laws leave compelled speakers
free to independently disclaim or even criticize the government’s message, the risk
of such confusion is negligible (and if a law forbade such disclaimers or criticism,
it would cease to raise a pure compelled-speech issue but rather would cross over
into speech suppression).
Second, one might be concerned that compelling people to speak the govern-
ment’s message might inculcate that message, and its attendant values, in the speakers
themselves, and so permit the government again to shape public debate, and the very
values of the citizenry, in ways that are entirely incompatible with popular sover-
eignty. Again, however, in pure compelled-speech cases this seems extremely unlikely.
Does anyone really believe that individuals driven by their “most deeply felt beliefs”203
or asked to say something contrary “to their deepest convictions”204 are going to
suddenly change their minds and abandon those beliefs and convictions simply
because they were forced to say a few words about the flag, drive around with an
unaltered license plate, post a notice, or sell a cake? The idea is frankly absurd.205
Furthermore, as Caroline Mala Corbin points out, the modern government-speech
doctrine explicitly permits the government to persuade its citizens and, absent a mis-
attribution problem, it is not entirely clear why compelled speech is a more problem-
atic form of persuasion than government speech from an instrumental perspective.206
Finally, perhaps compelled speech impacts public discourse and debate because
it threatens to drown out private voices. If so, that would surely be problematic for
democracy. But again, in none of the actual cases is this a plausible explanation for
what is happening. Remember that in all of these cases, there is, by definition, no actual
suppression of or limits on private speech.207 So unless there is an extraordinary
paucity of speech opportunities, or the compelled speech that is required is so con-
stant and ubiquitous that it occupies most of individuals’ speech opportunities, any
drowning out effect would be trivial at best. As noted earlier, such an effect might
explain and justify the result in American Beverage Association, and in the part of the
Supreme Court’s NIFLA decision which struck down the regulations on non-licensed
202 For similar arguments, see Alexander, supra note 8, at 152–53; Shiffrin, supra note 5,
at 505–06.
203 Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1724 (2018).
204 Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2379 (2018)
(Kennedy, J., concurring).
205 See Shiffrin, supra note 5, at 505–06.
206 Corbin, supra note 5, at 1302–04.
207 See, e.g., Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils Comm’n, 475 U.S. 1, 14 (1986) (plurality
opinion); Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714–15 (1977); Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v.
Tornillo, 241 U.S. 241, 257 (1974); W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624,
633–34 (1943).
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facilities.208 But in none of the other Supreme Court cases was the “compelled speech”
at issue anywhere near burdensome enough to drown out private speech. Moreover,
if such an effect did exist, then the case would cease to be one of pure compelled
speech and turn into one also involving speech suppression.
In short, the idea that pure compelled-speech claims implicate concerns about
undermining democratic debate is far-fetched. When one turns to dignity and con-
science, however, the link is close and obvious. Of course the Barnettes objected to
participation in a flag salute that, in their view, violated one of the Ten Command-
ments.209 Of course Maynard was offended by being forced to disseminate a govern-
ment message which violated his religious beliefs.210 Of course being required to
advertise free abortions violated the consciences of individuals belonging to a
religiously based group organized for the very purpose of preventing abortions.211
And, of course, an individual who opposed same-sex marriage had conscientious
objections to selling a wedding cake which celebrated such a union.212 None of which
is to say that these conscience-based objections should necessarily be upheld by the
law—that turns on how we should accommodate religious, conscience-based objections
to secular laws—our next topic. But that these objections sound in valid conscience-
based, dignitarian concerns is obvious.
Equally obvious is the doctrinal implication of this insight. If in fact pure
compelled-speech claims are fundamentally conscience-based, with few or no im-
plications for the vitality of democracy, then they should be rooted in the constitu-
tional provision which protects conscience rather than the provision which protects
democracy. Which, for all of the reasons discussed above, means the Free Exercise
Clause, not, as current doctrine suggests, the Free Speech Clause.213 Indeed, given
the uniformly religious motivations of almost all the plaintiffs in the most prominent
pure compelled-speech cases,214 this conclusion seems entirely obvious.
Why, then, has the Court treated compelled speech and compelled subsidy as
Free Speech rather than Free Exercise issues? The original choice, in Barnette itself,
appears to have been driven by Justice Jackson’s concerns that a religion-based
holding would not protect secular opponents of compulsory flag salutes.215 This
objection will be explored in more detail below, but in short, it is answerable. More
recently, the problem has been the Supreme Court’s holding in Employment Division
208 See supra Section II.B; see also Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates, 138 S. Ct. at
2378; Am. Beverage Ass’n v. City & Cty. of S.F., 916 F.3d 749, 757 (9th Cir. 2019).
209 See Barnette, 319 U.S. at 629.
210 See Maynard, 430 U.S. at 707 n.2.
211 See Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates, 138 S. Ct. at 2368–69.
212 See Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1723
(2018).
213 See supra Part III.
214 See supra notes 209–11 and accompanying text.
215 See W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 634–36 (1943).
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v. Smith.216 As noted earlier, the Smith Court in 1990 held—contrary to much ex-
isting precedent—that the Free Exercise Clause does not require the government to
grant religiously motivated exemptions to generally applicable statutes.217 Rather,
according to the Court, the Free Exercise Clause was intended only to invalidate laws
that singled out religious practices—an almost empty set in the modern world.218
Clearly, under Smith, compelled-speech claims rooted in the Free Exercise Clause
will almost always fail.219 None of the laws at issue in these cases singled out religious
practices, and it is highly unlikely that any of them were motivated by hostility to
religion. Rather, all were archetypal laws of general application designed to advance
secular state goals that happened to collide with specific religious beliefs.220 Indeed,
recall that Justice Frankfurter’s dissent in Barnette itself was based on the Smith-like
rationale that individuals have no right to disobey secular laws which violate their
beliefs.221 My argument that the Free Exercise Clause permits such claims is based
on the assumption—explicitly advanced by the concurring opinions in Barnette222—that
Smith is wrong and that religious exemptions to secular laws are sometimes re-
quired.223 There are reasons to believe that the modern Court is ready to reconsider
Smith in light of changed circumstances and steady scholarly criticism.224 This would
place the compelled-speech doctrine on firm grounds. It should be noted, however,
that if that does not happen, if Smith is retained, that does not mean that the Court
was correct to rely on the Free Speech Clause in pure compelled-speech cases.
Rather, it means that the Court was wrong in most cases to sustain such claims—yet
another reason why, pace Justice Frankfurter, Smith seems clearly wrong.225
This is not, of course, to say that all religious objections to secular laws must be
sustained. Such an approach has never been seriously advocated, and would lead to
chaos as well as grave social harms. Nor is it even to say that the correct test to
determine when religious exemptions should be granted is the “strict scrutiny” test
216 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
217 Id. at 878–79, 882.
218 See id. at 878. For a rare example of such a law, see Church of the Lukumi Babalu
Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
219 See Smith, 494 U.S. at 872, 882.
220 See, e.g., id. at 874; Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 707–08, 716 (1977); Barnette,
319 U.S. at 626 n.2.
221 See Smith, 494 U.S. at 878–79; Barnette, 319 U.S. at 653–54 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
222 See Barnette, 319 U.S. at 643–44 (Black & Douglas, JJ., concurring); id. at 645–46
(Murphy, J., concurring).
223 The leading defense of this position was advanced in McConnell, supra note 182, at
1497–98.
224 See Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1734
(2018) (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (“Smith remains controversial in many quarters.”); Linda
Greenhouse, Religious Crusaders at the Supreme Court’s Gates, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 12, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/12/opinion/supreme-court-religion.html [https://perma.cc
/PPC7-8QY5] (discussing pending appeal requesting Supreme Court to overrule Smith).
225 See Smith, 494 U.S. 872; Barnette, 319 U.S. 624.
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rejected by Smith (but then reinstated by the Religious Freedom Restoration Act in
certain cases).226 But it is to say that, at a minimum, when a law compelling speech
(or for that matter any law regulating conduct) imposes significant conscience-based
burdens, the government must be able to advance some substantial interest to justify
that burden. As it turns out (and as we shall see), even this minimal principle
suffices to resolve many (though not all) compelled-speech cases.
B. Who Can Make Compelled Speech Claims?
If pure compelled-speech claims are best understood to be rooted in the policies of
the Free Exercise Clause, then one question that arises is who can raise such claims.
At a minimum it is clear that individuals—that is to say, natural persons—with seri-
ous religious compunctions against compliance with a legal requirement can do so.
The more difficult question is whether anyone else may.
Let us begin by returning to Justice Jackson’s objection in Barnette to rooting
the decision in freedom of religion.227 His concern was that such a holding would
sustain only religious objections to participation in the flag salute, not secular ones.228
At first cut, his objection seems valid. Such a holding would clearly have sustained the
Barnettes’ religious objections to participation. But because the text of the First Amend-
ment protects only religion and religious conscience (which the Framers equated
with conscience generally), secular objectors would appear to have no constitutional re-
course.229 As a matter of pure and narrow original understanding, this conclusion might
well be correct,230 and Michael McConnell has defended precisely this position.231
In fact, however, the story is unsurprisingly much more complicated and the
subject of extensive academic debate.232 Many scholars have argued that whatever
the language of the First Amendment, or even its original understanding, under modern
conditions, the Free Exercise Clause can and should be read to extend to conscience
claims based in secular belief systems, provided that those systems are sufficiently
deeply held and bound up in personal identity.233 Micah Schwartzman in particular
makes a convincing case that it was the Framers’ very inability to conceive of non-
theistic belief systems (including some religions) that individuals see as imposing
conscientious obligations as binding as traditional religions, that compels us to expand
226 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 515–16 (1997).
227 See Barnette, 319 U.S. at 634–36.
228 See id.
229 See id. at 635 n.16 (“That the flag-salute is an allowable portion of a school program for
those who do not invoke conscientious scruples is surely not debatable.” (quoting Minersville
Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 599 (1940))).
230 See Schwartzman, supra note 192, at 1405, 1414–15.
231 McConnell, supra note 189, at 12–14.
232 Schwartzman, supra note 187, at 335 n.49 (citing sources on both sides of debate).
233 See, e.g., Schwartzman, supra note 187, at 1419–20; Smith, supra note 187, at 936–37.
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the concept of “religious conscience” to include secular claimants.234 And indeed,
Schwartzman notes that there is Supreme Court case law (albeit engaging in statu-
tory interpretation) which supports this view.235 It is far beyond the scope of this
Article to resolve this ongoing and deep debate, but for our purposes it is sufficient
to note that rooting compelled-speech cases in the Free Exercise Clause does not
necessarily, as Justice Jackson assumed, doom secular claimants.
It should be noted, however, that objections to compelled speech based on con-
science, even if extended to secular, conscience-based claims, do not translate into a
general right against any compelled speech with which one disagrees. Such objections
must be rooted in the kinds of deeply personal, dignitary values and beliefs that are
comparable to religious conscience. The alternative is not only chaos, but also results
that bear no relation to the Free Exercise Clause’s goal of protecting freedom of
conscience. The reasons should be clear: violations of conscience impose deeply felt
harms to dignity and “personhood,” as Steven D. Smith puts it,236 that merely being
forced to say something one disagrees with does not. One might phrase the point this
way: do individuals ever voluntarily say things that they disagree with? The answer is,
of course they do, including everything from white lies in social contexts to the instru-
mental lies told by undercover law enforcement and journalists. None of this im-
pinges on individual conscience. Concomitantly, do individuals voluntarily engage in
prayer or other religious exercise that runs contrary to their religious beliefs? Of
course they do not—precisely because to do so would be inconsistent with their con-
science. As Smith points out, however, in the modern world there clearly exist secular
belief systems that are parallel to religious beliefs in this sense, that they implicate
personhood and conscience.237 But it is equally clear that objections based on mere
disagreement with a message that one is required to convey do not rise to this level.
Finally, we come to the question of claimants other than individuals—i.e., groups,
nonprofit organizations, and corporations. With respect to entities such as churches
or the Crisis Pregnancy Centers in the NIFLA case, who are formed for the very
purpose of advancing their members’ religious beliefs and practices, there seems no
reason not to permit them to bring claims based on those beliefs and practices.238
Similarly, if freedom-of-conscience claims are extended to secular belief systems,
organizations formed to advance such systems should also be permitted to raise
conscience claims on behalf of their members. The analogy here is to organizational
standing,239 and seems straightforward.
234 See Schwartzman, supra note 187, at 1405, 1426.
235 Id. at 1417–18 (discussing Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970); United States
v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965)).
236 Smith, supra note 187, at 935.
237 Id. at 936–37.
238 See Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018).
239 Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 739 (1972) (“It is clear that an organization whose
members are injured may represent those members in a proceeding for judicial review.”).
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The more difficult question concerns for-profit corporations and other groups
whose purposes and functions are not directly related to its members’/owners’ claims
of conscience. Even among these, it is possible that some groups, such as the closely
held, for-profit corporation in the Hobby Lobby litigation,240 are sufficiently inter-
twined with their members’/owners’ religious or other conscientious commitments
that they should be permitted to raise such claims.241 Regardless, what is absolutely
clear is that a for-profit, publicly traded corporation such as R.J. Reynolds (the
plaintiff in the D.C. Circuit graphic warning litigation) has no plausible claim under
the Free Exercise Clause, or any other conscience-based theory.242 Such corporations
have no common identity with its dispersed, largely anonymous, and passive owners;
and fictional entities such as corporations cannot themselves possess the sort of
deeply held, religious or quasi-religious commitments that are at the heart of pure
compelled-speech claims. Publicly traded corporations generally, much less tobacco
companies, obviously have no consciences. As then-Justice Rehnquist put it in his
dissent in the PG&E case, “Extension of the individual freedom of conscience de-
cisions to business corporations strains the rationale of those cases beyond the
breaking point. To ascribe to such artificial entities an ‘intellect’ or ‘mind’ for freedom
of conscience purposes is to confuse metaphor with reality.”243
It should be noted that this conclusion does not mean that publicly traded cor-
porations can bring no compelled-speech claims. When the impact of a law compel-
ling speech, such as in Tornillo, is to suppress or disincentivize the corporation’s
own speech, the latter effect surely states a claim under the Free Speech Clause.244
In addition, such entities might be able to bring claims under a distinct right against
“compelled association” that Larry Alexander identifies.245 But publicly traded cor-
porations have no plausible claim to “pure” compelled-speech rights.
V. IMPLICATIONS FOR CURRENT LAW
The reformulation of the law of compelled speech that I propose here, rooting
pure claims of compelled speech in the rights of conscience protected by the Free
Exercise Clause rather than the instrumental rights of expression protected by the Free
Speech Clause, appears to be a radical one. What is notable, however, is that when
one looks at the actual law, as developed by the Supreme Court, the changes this
240 See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, Inc., 573 U.S. 682 (2014).
241 There are, of course, also strong arguments against ever permitting a for-profit corporation
enjoying the benefits of limited liability to claim unity with its owners, and so to invoke con-
science claims on its owners’ behalf.
242 R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
243 Pac. Gas & Elec. Co v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 475 U.S. 1, 33 (1986) (plurality opinion)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see also Shiffrin, supra note 5, at 501–02.
244 Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 257 (1974).
245 See Alexander, supra note 8, at 150.
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rethinking would entail are actually quite limited. The key, foundational cases in-
cluding Barnette and Maynard, remain clearly correctly decided because the plaintiffs
had explicitly raised religious conscience claims, and the government could not
articulate any plausible and significant interest that would outweigh that claim.246
More recently, the part of the NIFLA decision striking down the notice requirement
for licensed clinics also falls within this category (though the question of whether
the government had a significant, countervailing interest is a closer one there, given
the plausible argument that poor women were unaware of the availability of
government-funded health care).247 And Masterpiece Cakeshop also clearly involves
a conscience-based claim—though there, the argument for a substantial, countervailing
government interest is much stronger.248
Moving beyond these decisions, all of which involve religiously motivated
claimants, many of the other key Supreme Court decisions are explicable as involving
not pure compulsion, but also suppression, punishment, and/or displacement of speech.
Tornillo clearly falls within this category,249 and Justice Marshall’s separate opinion
in PG&E, which provided the essential fifth vote for the result, also relied on a
displacement rationale.250 The Hurley and Riley decisions, as noted earlier,251 also fall
within this category. And so too does the part of the NIFLA decision involving regula-
tion of unlicensed facilities, which the Court specifically held was invalid because
the required notice “drowns out the facility’s own message . . . [and] ‘effectively rules
out’ the possibility of having [an advertisement] in the first place.”252 But notably, when
neither a plausible conscience claim, nor suppression of speech are present, the
Court (whatever it says) has generally rejected compelled-speech claims handily.253
246 See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 707–08, 716–17 (1977); W. Va. State Bd. of
Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 629–31 (1943).
247 See Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2371, 2375
(2018).
248 See Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719,
1724–25 (2018).
249 See Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 257.
250 Pac. Gas & Elec. Co v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 475 U.S. 1, 23–24 (1986) (plurality opinion)
(Marshall, J., concurring in judgment).
251 See Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., Inc., 515 U.S. 557 (1995);
Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781 (1988).
252 Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2378 (quoting Ibanez v. Fla. Dep’t of Bus. & Prof ’l Regulation,
512 U.S. 136, 146 (1994)).
253 See, e.g., Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. & Institutional Rights, 547 U.S. 47 (2006) (re-
jecting claim by law schools required to host military recruiters); Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 520
U.S. 180 (1997) (rejecting claim by cable operator forced to carry signal of broadcast television
stations); Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626 (1985) (rejecting claim
by attorney required to disclose potential cost responsibility to clients); Pruneyard Shopping Ctr.
v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980) (rejecting compelled-speech claim by shopping center owner
required to permit solicitors onto their property).
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What is equally clear, however, is that many of the recent compelled-speech cases
from the courts of appeals are simply indefensible. Certainly not all of them are
wrong—as noted earlier, the Ninth Circuit’s American Beverage Association case
relied on a “drown[ing] out” rationale which is consistent with my analysis.254 But other
important decisions, notably the D.C. Circuit’s decisions striking down the FDA’s
graphic tobacco warnings255 and the SEC’s conflict mineral rule256 cannot be sustained
on a suppression or “drown[ing] out” approach. Nor is there any theory under which
a publicly traded corporation has an interest, rooted in conscience, in refusing to
publicize the harm caused by its products, whether direct or indirect. Of course such
compelled speech does interfere with the corporations’ primary goal, to maximize
profits, but an artificial entity’s pursuit of money is in no way comparable to the reli-
gious or quasi-religious belief systems that must underlie conscience-based arguments.
A. Compelled Subsidies
Finally, we will close by briefly examining the problem of compelled subsidies, il-
lustrated by the recent Janus decision striking down “agency fees” payable to public
sector unions.257 The clear implication of a conscience-based approach to compelled
speech, briefly, is that compelled subsidy claims are completely implausible. The
reasons are simple. First, the Supreme Court has long held that there can be no
conscience-based claim against paying taxes or other money to the government even
when the money is being used to fund activities that run strongly contrary to an
individual’s religious beliefs.258 Any other result would, of course, cripple the gov-
ernment’s ability to function. Nonetheless, as noted earlier, in Janus and Abood, the
Court quoted Jefferson for the proposition that “to compel a man to furnish contribu-
tions of money for the propagation of opinions which he disbelieves and abhor[s]
is sinful and tyrannical.”259 This citation was, however, used entirely out of context
because Jefferson’s statement was narrowly and clearly directed at propagation of
religious opinions only, given that it was made in support of his Bill for Establishing
Religious Freedom.260 And, it should be noted, even this narrow proposition was
heavily contested in the Framing era and early Republic, based on the argument that
254 Am. Beverage Ass’n v. City & Cty. of S.F., 916 F.3d 749, 757 (9th Cir. 2019) (quoting
Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2378).
255 R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
256 Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. SEC, 748 F.3d 359 (2014), adhered to on reh’g, 800 F.3d 518
(D.C. Cir. 2015).
257 Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty. & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2486
(2018).
258 United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982) (rejecting claim by member of the Old Order
Amish for religiously based exemption from social security taxes).
259 Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2464 (quoting Jefferson, supra note 50, at 545 (emphasis and foot-
note omitted)); Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Ed., 431 U.S. 209, 234 n.31 (1977) (quoting 1 IRVING
BRANT, JAMES MADISON: THE NATIONALIST 354 (1948)).
260 See BRANT, supra note 259, at 354.
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“money isn’t conscience.”261 Regardless, while the Supreme Court has permitted
taxpayers to object under the Establishment Clause to expenditures which advance
religion,262 there is no reason to believe that this Establishment Clause principle is
properly rooted in rights of conscience, as opposed to instrumental concerns.263 As
such, Jefferson’s statement provides no support for a right against paying taxes which
advance secular views, whether by the government directly, or by government funding
of private speakers.
Modern compelled-subsidy claims must then rest on the theory that there is a
meaningful, conscience-based distinction between paying money to the government
to fund speech (whether governmental or private) with which one disagrees, and being
forced by the government to pay money directly to private persons who disseminate
the same views. This, however, as William Baude and Eugene Volokh have pointed
out, is decidedly odd.264 Such fine gradations seem to have little relevance to the
sorts of fundamental, conscience-based objections that were raised in cases such as
Barnette and Maynard, and so conscience-based claims rooted in this distinction are
not particularly credible.265 In short, there seems little basis to believe that there is
a conscience-based First Amendment right against exactions of money that fund
speech (or any other activity) to which the payer has conscience-based objections.266
The Court’s decision in Janus was thus simply incorrect.267
CONCLUSION
In recent years, the compelled-speech doctrine has come unmoored from its
roots in the principles of conscience that drove the early decisions in this area. This
tendency is evident in some very loose and broad language in recent Supreme Court
261 Schwartzman, supra note 187, at 372–74; see also Steven D. Smith, Taxes, Conscience,
and the Constitution, 23 CONST. COMMENT 365, 374–75 (2006).
262 Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
263 Smith, supra note 261, at 369–70. Such instrumental goals would presumably circle
around a desire to preempt potentially destructive contests among religious sects for control
of the State and its resources.
264 See Baude & Volokh, supra note 5, at 184–85; cf. Aaron Tang, Public Sector Unions, the
First Amendment, and the Costs of Collective Bargaining, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 144, 223–25 (2016)
(suggesting reasons why funneling money through the government, rather than directly to private
speakers, might make a difference for First Amendment purposes, without resolving the issue).
265 See Schwartzman, supra note 187, at 368–69.
266 This does not to foreclose that possibility of an instrumental right against compelled sup-
port of political parties or candidates; but as Baude and Volokh point out, such a right would
have to be rooted in an instrumental prohibition on the government funding political parties
or candidates. Baude & Volokh, supra note 5, at 191–94.
267 Indeed, as Baude and Volokh also note, the clear implication of this conclusion is that
not only was Janus wrong, but Abood was wrong as well in striking down the use of agency
fees to fund the political activities of unions, with the caveat noted in the previous footnote.
See id. at 171–72.
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opinions (though not, it should be noted, in the results in most of the Court’s cases).
But it has manifested itself particularly strongly and troublingly in a series of recent
cases, most of which arose in the D.C. Circuit.268 These decisions have embraced the
claim that there is some sort of strong, constitutional presumption against anyone ever
having to speak against their will. This proposition, however, is entirely implausible,
ignoring as it does the ubiquity in commercial and professional contexts of speech
and disclosure requirements.269 The result of this entirely erroneous presumption has
been a series of decisions narrowing the scope of permitted disclosure requirements,
and shifting the burden of proof to the government to justify even those requirements
that might be permissible, even when the context is commercial or economic regu-
lation with no possible relationship to claims of conscience.270
This Article argues that while the Lochnerization271 of the compelled speech and
compelled subsidy doctrines is a relatively recent phenomenon, it has its roots in a very
old mistake. That mistake was Justice Jackson’s decision to root his foundational
compelled-speech opinion in Barnette in the Free Speech Clause rather than in the
Free Exercise Clause.272 That decision has, over time, lead courts to forget that pure
compelled-speech claims are only plausible when rooted in rights of conscience, the
reason being that freedom of conscience in fact is a poor fit as an explanation for
free speech rights, while it is a close fit for free exercise rights. It is time, I have argued,
for us to fix that mistake. Such a fix will retain the core of the compelled-speech
doctrine as it developed since 1943, while rejecting recent unjustified extensions.
268 See Am. Beverage Ass’n v. City & Cty. of S.F., 916 F.3d 749 (9th Cir. 2019); Nat’l
Ass’n of Mfrs. v. SEC, 748 F.3d 359 (D.C. Cir. 2014), adhered to on reh’g, 800 F.3d 518 (D.C.
Cir. 2015); Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. NLRB, 717 F.3d 947 (D.C. Cir. 2013); R.J. Reynolds
Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
269 See Shiffrin, supra note 5, at 504–05.
270 See generally supra Section II.B (discussing courts of appeal rulings concerning eco-
nomic regulations and disclosure requirements).
271 See Robert Post & Amanda Shanor, Adam Smith’s First Amendment, 128 HARV. L. REV.
F. 165, 167 (2015); Amanda Shanor, The New Lochner, 2016 WIS. L. REV. 133, 135–36 (2016).
272 See W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 633–34 (1943).
